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PROCEEDINGS (in chambers): ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO STRIKE
[Docket No. 19]; ORDER DENYING AS MOOT DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS [Docket
No. 20]
These matters are before the Court on: (1) Defendant X17, Inc.'s ("Defendant") Motion to Strike
Complaint Pursuant to Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 425.16 ("Mot. to Strike"), filed November 27, 2018,
and (2) Defendant's Motion to Dismiss Third Cause of Action in Plaintiff's First Amended
Complaint ("Mot. to Dismiss"), filed November 27, 2018. Plaintiff Complex Media, Inc. ("Plainitff")
opposed Defendant's Motion to Strike ("Pl.'s Opp'n") on December 24, 2018 1 and filed a nonopposition to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss on December 24, 2018. Plaintiff Complex Media, Inc.
(“Plaintiff”) filed an Opposition to the Defendant’s Motion to Strike (“Pls’ Opp’n”).(2) Defendant’s
Motion to Dismiss Third Cause of Action in Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint ("Mot. to Dismiss"),
filed November 27, 2018. On December 24, 2018, Plaintiff Complex Media, Inc. (“Plaintiff”) filed
Statement of Non-opposition to the Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss (“Pls’ Non-Opp’n”).
The Court found these matters appropriate for disposition without oral argument and vacated the
hearing scheduled for January 14, 2019. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 78(b). For the foregoing reasons,

1

As a threshold matter, Plaintiff argues that Defendant's failure to comply with the Local
Rule 7-3 and paragraph 23(a) of this Court's Initial Standing Order renders its Motion to
Strike defective. (Pls' Opp'n 6-7, ECF 21.) Pursuant to Local Rule 7-3, counsel are
required to meet and confer prior to the filing of a motion, and must include in the motion
"a declaration by counsel briefly describing the parties' discussion. . . ." L.R. 7-3. It
appears that the parties thoroughly discussed the substance of the contemplated Motion
to Strike, such as bringing the motion California’s anti-SLAP statute and not moving to
dismiss FAC's first cause faction. (See Decl. of Butler-Swiech in Supp. Pls' Opp'n ¶¶ 22-3.)
However, the Court agrees that Defendant violated Local Rule 7-3 by failing to briefly
describe the parties' discussion. Notwithstanding this defect, the Court exercises its
discretion and accepts the Motion. See, e.g., Prince-Weithorn v. GMAC Mortg., LLC , No.
CV 11-00816 SJO, 2011 W L 11651984, at *1 n.1 (C.D. Cal. May 5, 2011).
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the Court GRANTS Defendant’s Motion to Strike, and DENIES AS MOOT Defendant’s Motion to
Dismiss.
I.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) alleges the following. (FAC, ECF No. 18.) Plaintiff
is a Delaware corporation that creates, produces, publishes, and distributes news content and
commentary through a variety of means, including its website and third party platforms such as
Roku and Apple TV, and online video streaming services like Youtube. (FAC ¶¶ 5, 11, 13.)
Defendant is a California corporation that “claims to own and license copyrights in photographs
and video footage of celebrities.” (FAC ¶¶ 1, 6.) Defendant is also an active user and channel
operator on Youtube. (FAC ¶ 23.)
Beginning on or about August 15, 2018, Defendant began filing requests that Youtube remove
Plaintiff’s videos (“Takedown Notices”) pursuant to the 17 U.S.C. § 512(c) of the Digital Millennium
Copyright Act (“DMCA”). (FAC ¶ 23.) The notices asserted that Plaintiff infringed on Defendant’s
copyrights by using certain photographs and videos in news reports posted to its Youtube
Channel, “Complex News” (the “Channel”). (FAC ¶¶ 1, 24-25.) Within two weeks, “X17 filed at
least six DMCA Takedown Notices targeted at videos Complex posted to its Channel.” (FAC ¶
24.) After Defendant filed the DMCA notices, Youtube disabled access to Plaintiff’s videos
containing the allegedly infringing content. (FAC ¶¶ 19, 37, 45.) Youtube also disabled Plaintiff’s
ability to upload new content to its Channel and to edit public-facing features of the Channel such
as profile and description and threatened to terminate the Channel, which Plaintiff alleges “would
result in the loss of all 2.4 million of the Channel’s subscribers.” (FAC ¶¶ 48-50.)
On August 30, 2018, Plaintiff filed the present action, asserting: (1) misrepresentation of copyright
claims under the DMCA, (2) declaration of non-infringement of copyright, and (3) intentional
interference with contractual relations. (See generally FAC.) On November 27, 2018, Defendant
filed the instant Motion to Strike Plaintiff's Complaint. (Mot. to Strike, ECF No. 19.) In the Motion
to Strike, Defendant contends that Plaintiff’s Third Cause of Action, intentional interference with
contractual relations, comes under the scope of Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 425.16(a), California’s antiSLAPP (Strategic Lawsuit Against Public Participation) statute. (See Mot. to Strike 2.) Defendant
also brought the Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Third Cause of Action on November 27, 2018. (Mot.
to Dismiss, ECF No. 20.) On December 24, 2018, Plaintiff filed Statement of Non-opposition to
the Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss. (Pls’ Non-Opp’n, ECF No. 22.)
///
///
///
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DISCUSSION
A.

Anti-SLAPP Motion to Strike

In its Motion to Strike, Defendant argues that the third cause of action in the FAC, intentional
interference with contractual relations, is subject to motion to strike pursuant to California Code
of Civil Procedure Section 425.16 (the "Anti-SLAPP" statute). (Mot. to Strike, ECF No. 19.) The
Court considers the merits of Defendant’s Motion to Strike despite Plaintiff’s Non-Opposition to
the Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss as a successful Anti-SLAPP motion would entitle Defendant
to recover its attorneys' fees and costs. See eCash Technologies, Inc. v. Guagliardo, 127 F.
Supp. 2d 1069, 1083-85 (C.D. Cal. 2000), aff’d, 35 F. App’x 498 (9th Cir. 2002) (court proceeds
with motion to strike despite voluntary dismissal).
1.

Legal Standard

California’s anti-SLAPP statute was enacted as an attempt to curb the increasing number of
lawsuits being "brought primarily to chill the valid exercise of the constitutional rights of freedom
of speech and petition for the redress of grievances." Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 425.16(a). In
passing § 425.16(a), "[t]he Legislature f[ound] and declare[d] that it [was] in the public interest
to encourage continued participation in matters of public significance, and that this participation
should not be chilled through abuse of the judicial process." Id. In light of the public policy at
stake, “[t]he statute is to ‘be broadly construed . . . .’” Bleavins v. Demarest, 196 Cal. App. 4th
1533, 1539 (2011)(quoting Wanland v. Law Offices of Mastagni, Holstedt & Chiurazzi, 141 Cal.
App. 4th 15, 22 (2006)); see also Mindys Cosmetics, Inc. v. Dakar, 611 F.3d 590, 596 (9th Cir.
2010); Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 425.16(a). Section 425.16(b) provides:
A cause of action against a person arising from any act of that person in furtherance
of the person's right of petition or free speech under the United States Constitution
or the California Constitution in connection with a public issue shall be subject to a
special motion to strike, unless the court determines that the plaintiff has
established that there is a probability that the plaintiff will prevail on the claim.
Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 425.16(b). "Motions to strike a state law claim under California's antiSLAPP statute may be brought in federal court." Vess v. Ciba-Geigy Corp. USA, 317 F.3d 1097,
1109 (9th Cir. 2003). 2

2

If a defendant moves to strike based on purely legal arguments and the fact that a
complaint does not allege sufficient facts to support its stated causes of action, courts
analyze the motion under the standards set out for motion to dismiss in Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 8 and 12(b)(6). See Planned Parenthood Fed'n of Am., Inc. v. Ctr. for Med.
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"A court considering a motion to strike under the anti-SLAPP statute must engage in a two-part
inquiry." Vess, 317 F.3d at 1110. First, "a defendant must make an initial prima facie showing
that the plaintiff's suit arises from an act in furtherance of the defendant's rights of petition or
speech." Id. Second, "once the defendant has made a prima facie showing, 'the burden shifts
to the plaintiff to demonstrate a probability of prevailing on the challenged claims.'" Id.
With respect to the first prong, as held by the California Supreme Court, "[t]he statutory phrase
'cause of action . . . arising from' means simply that the defendant's act underlying the plaintiff's
cause of action must itself have been an act in furtherance of the right of petition or free speech."
Freeman v. Schack, 64 Cal.Rptr.3d 867, 873 (2007) (emphasis in original) (citing City of Cotati
v. Cashman, 29 Cal.4th 69, 78 (2002)).
If a defendant meets its initial burden with respect to the first prong of the analysis, courts proceed
to the second prong. Baharian-Mehr v. Smith, 117 Cal.Rptr.3d 153, 159 (2010). The second
prong requires that the plaintiff “demonstrate that the complaint is both legally sufficient and
supported by a sufficient prima facie showing of facts to sustain a favorable judgment if the
evidence submitted by the plaintiff is credited.” Hilton v. Hallmark Cards, 599 F.3d 894, 903 (9th
Cir.2010) (internal quotation marks omitted).
2.

Plaintiff’s Intentional Interference With Contractual Relations Claim Relates
to Defendant’s Right of Free Speech

California’s anti-SLAPP statute defines an "act in furtherance of a person's right of petition or free
speech" as:
(1) any written or oral statement or writing made before a legislative, executive, or judicial
proceeding, or any other official proceeding authorized by law;
(2) any written or oral statement or writing made in connection with an issue under
consideration or review by a legislative, executive, or judicial body, or any other official
proceeding authorized by law;
(3) any written or oral statement or writing made in a place open to the public or a public
forum in connection with an issue of public interest;

Progress, 890 F.3d 828, 833–34 (9th Cir. 2018). Here, Defendant’s Motion to Strike is
analogous to a motion to dismiss because it is founded on purely legal arguments and
does not provide alternate facts challenging allegations made in the FAC . (See generally
Mot. to Strike.) As such, the Court applies a Rule12(b)(6) motion to dismiss standard to
Defendant’s Motion to Strike.
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(4) or any other conduct in furtherance of the exercise of the constitutional right to petition
or the constitutional right of free speech in connection with a public issue or an issue of
public interest.
Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 425.16(e). It is the fourth category that is most directly at issue in this
case. Defendant contends that its filing of DMCA Takedown Notices constitutes “conduct in
furtherance of the exercise of the constitutional right to petition or the constitutional right of free
speech in connection with a public issue or an issue of public interest.”3 Cal. Civ. Proc. Code §
425.16(e)(4).
Defendant argues that filing of the notices is an exercise of its right of free speech. (Mot. to Strike
at 6.) Generally, speech is protected under the First Amendment unless it falls within “a few
limited areas, which are ‘of such slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be
derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and morality.’” R.A.V. v.
City of St. Paul, Minn., 505 U.S. 337, 382-83 (1992) (quoting Chaplinsky v. State of N.H., 315 U.S.
568, 572 (1942)). “First Amendment standards must give the benefit of any doubt to protecting
rather than stifling speech.” Citizens United v Fed. Election Com’n, 558 U.S. 310, 327 (2010).
Applying this broadly defined freedom of speech, the Court agrees with Defendant that filing of
a takedown notices is constitutionally protected speech. See e.g., Lenz v. Universal Music Corp.,
No. C 07-03783, 2008 WL 962102, at *4 (N.D. Cal. 2008) (filing of DMCA takedown notice
constitutes free speech). Thus, the Court must next determine whether its filing of DMCA
takedown notices is a conduct “in connection with a public issue or an issue of public interest.”
Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 425.16(e)(4).
While Section 425.16 does not define “public interest,” courts considering the issue have
construed the term broadly, in some cases finding that it “governs even private communications,
so long as they concern a public issue.” Wilbanks v. Wolk, 121 Cal. App. 4th 883, 897 (2004);
see Nyard, Inc. v. Uusi-Kerttula, 159 Cal. App. 4th 1027, 1039 (2008) (discussing the Legislature
amending the anti-SLAPP statute in 1997 to include a directive to construe the statute broadly).
Further, courts have held that the definition of “public interest” under the anti-SLAPP statute
includes “conduct that could directly affect a large number of people beyond the direct
participants.” Rivero v. Am. Fed’n of State, Cty., and Mun. Emp., AFL-CIO, 105 Cal. App. 4th 913,

3

Defendant also argues that its filing of Takedown Notices constitutes an “oral statement
or writing made in connection with an issue under consideration or review by a . . . judicial
body, or any other official proceeding authorized by law.” Cal. Code Civ. Proc. §
425.16(e)(2). The Court need not address this argument because the Court finds that
Defendant’s filing of DMCA takedown notices in this case is a “conduct in furtherance of
the exercise of the constitutional . . . right of free speech in connection with a public issue
or an issue of public interest.” Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 425.16(e)(4).
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924 (2003). For example, in Damon v. Ocean Hills Journalism Club, the court concluded that
homeowners’ statements about the management of their homeowners association were
connected with an issue of public interest because the governance of the association was an
issue of concern for each of the 3,000 individuals who belong to the association. 85 Cal. App. 4
468, 479-80 (2000). Similarly, the court in Ludwig v. Superior Court concluded that the
development of a mall, “with potential environmental effects such as increased traffic and
impaction on natural drainage, was clearly a matter of public interest.” 43 Cal. App. 4th 8, 15
(1995); see also Church of Scientology v. Wollersheim, 42 Cal. App. 4 628, 650 (1996) (“[T]he
Church is a matter of public interest, as evidenced by media coverage and the extent of the
Church’s membership and asset.”)
Plaintiff contends that Defendant’s filing of DMCA notice is not protected as “an issue of public
interest” under California’s anti-SLAPP statute because the notice itself did not involve a topic of
public interest. (Pl.’s Non-Opp’n at 13-15.) To support this argument, Plaintiff relies on Lenz. (Pl.'s
Non-Opp'n at 14.) In Lenz, defendant Universal submitted a DMCA notice alleging that plaintiff
Lenz' video of her son dancing to a Prince song infringed its copyrights. Lenz, 2008 WL 962102,
at *1. Lenz sued Universal alleging misuse of the DMCA takedown notice, and intentional
interference with her contract with Youtube. Id. In response, Universal filed an anti-SLAPP
motion to strike Lenz’ intentional interference with contract claim, arguing that its filing of the
DMCA takedown notice was “an issue of public interest” because after filing the suit, Lenz
discussed her experience on television news shows and her personal blog show. Id. at *3-4. The
court rejected this argument, reasoning that “Universal’s speech does not fall within the
protections of the anti-SLAPP statute simply because Lenz appeared on television to discuss her
case and wrote about her case on her blog,” and denied the motion. Id. at *4.
However, Lenz is distinguishable from the instant case. Lenz involved a home video posted to
a personal Youtube channel. See Lenz, 2008 WL 962102, at *1. No facts suggested that
Lenz’ Youtube channel had a large number subscribers. See generally id. Therefore, unlike
the present matter, the availability of the targeted video would not be an issue of concern to a
large online community of followers. Further, Lenz’ appearances on television and publishing
of blog shows commenting on the suit did not transform Universal’s DMCA notices into an
issue that affects a large number of people, rather, it merely publicizes a conduct that affects a
limited audience. Indeed, the courts have established that “[a] person cannot turn otherwise
private information into a matter of public interest simply by communicating it to a large
number of people.” Weinberg v. Feisel, 110 Cal. App. 4 1122, 1133 (2003); see also Rivera,
105 Cal. App. 4th at 926 (“If the mere publication of information in a union newsletter
distributed to its numerous members were sufficient to make that information a matter of
public interest, the public-issue limitation would be substantially eroded . . . .”).
The instant case is more closely analogous to Damon and Ludwig because Defendant’s filing
of DMCA notices in this case is also a conduct that directly impacts a large community of
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people. Defendant’s Takedown Notices are requests for removal of videos containing
allegedly infringing content on Plaintiff’s channel. (See FAC ¶¶ 19, 24.) At that time, Plaintiff
had already built a channel with a large community of 2.4 million subscribers and the DMCA
notices, when granted, directly affected every subscribers' access to the targeted videos on
that Chennel. (See FAC ¶¶ 48-50.) Conduct affecting the availability of videos in this large
online community is a concern for each subscribing member of the public and thus,“an issue
of public interest.”
Accordingly, Defendant has met its burden of showing that the filing of the DMCA notices is a
conduct made in connection with “in connection with a public issue or an issue of public
interest” pursuant to Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 425.16(e)(4).
3.

Plaintiff Fails to Establish a Prima Facie Case for Intentional Interference
With Contractual Relations

The Court next analyzes whether Plaintiff has established a prima facie case for intentional
interference with contractual relations. Plaintiff argues that Defendant interfered with its
contractual relationship with Youtube by improperly using the DMCA takedown process.4 (See
FAC ¶¶ 72-76.) Defendant counters that Plaintiff cannot show a probability that it will prevail
on the merits of its claim because Plaintiff’s state law claim for intentional interference with
contractual relations is preempted by the DMCA.5 (Mot. to Strike at 10-14.)

4

Plaintiff contends that it disabled one of the videos upon receiving Defendant's
Takedown Notice, but alleges that the other five videos are not infringing. (FAC ¶ 24.)
Plaintiff argues that “X17 did not own the rights in the photographs and videos it claimed
Complex infringed at the time X17 filed the DMCA takedown notices.” (FAC ¶ 25.) It
points to documents produced by Defendant on September 12, 2018 titled “Copyright
Transfer Agreement,” in which photographers purportedly transferred to Defendants all
rights, title and interest in the photographs and videos at issue in Defendant’s DMCA
takedown notices. (FAC ¶ 26.) The earliest date of execution for any of these Copyright
Transfer Agreements was August 31, 2018, “sixteen days after X17 filed its first DMCA
notice against Complex.” (FAC ¶ 26.) The Copyright Transfer Agreements did not indicate
that any of the photographers authorized Defendant to make claims under the DMCA on
their behalf prior to the agreements’ effective dates. (FAC ¶ 27.) Additionally, Plaintiff
alleges that the five videos were not infringing because the videos made fair use of the
photographs and videos at issue. (FAC ¶ 28.)
5

In its Opposition, Plaintiff relies on Rossi v. Motion Picture Ass’n of Am., Inc for the
proposition that its state law claim is not preempted by federal law. (Pls’ Opp’n at 18.)
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The Court agrees with Defendant that Plaintiff’s state law claim is preempted by federal law.
Numerous courts within the 9th Circuit have held that 17 U.S.C. § 512(f) of the DMCA
preempts state law claims based on DMCA takedown notifications. See e.g., Online Policy
Group v. Diebold, 337 F. Supp. 2d 1195 (N.D. Cal. 2004); see Lenz, 2008 WL 962102, at *4;
Amaretto Ranch Breedables, LLC v. Ozimals, Inc., No. C 10-05696, 2011 W L 2690437, at *4
(N.D. Cal. 2011). Applying the doctrine of conflict preemption, one such court found that:
Even if a copyright holder does not intend to cause anything other than the removal of
allegedly infringing material, compliance with the DMCA's procedures nonetheless may
result in disruption of a contractual relationship: by sending a letter, the copyright holder
can effectuate the disruption of ISP service to clients. If adherence to the DMCA's
provisions simultaneously subjects the copyright holder to state tort law liability, there is
an irreconcilable conflict between state and federal law. To the extent that Plaintiffs
argue that there is no conflict because [Defendant’s] use of the DMCA in this case was
based on misrepresentation of [Defendant’s] rights, their argument is undercut by the
provisions of the statute itself.
Online Policy Group, 337 F.Supp. 2d at 1205-06. As the court in Lenz noted, “‘[g]iven that a
special provision of the Copyright Act itself regulates misrepresentation in such notifications,
that provision constitutes the sole remedy for a customer who objects to its contents and their
effects.’” Lenz, 2008 WL 962102, at *4 (quoting 1 Melville B. Nimmer & David Nimmer, 1
Nimmer on Copyright § 1.18[A][1] (2019). Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Defendant’s
motion to strike Plaintiff’s state law claim and STRIKES Plaintiff's claim for intentional
interference with contractual relations.
B.

Attorney’s Fees

Having granted the Motion to Strike, the Court finally holds that Defendant is entitled to
attorney's fees. California law is unambiguous that "a prevailing defendant on a special
motion to strike shall be entitled to recover his or her attorney's fees and costs." Cal. Code
Civ. Proc. § 425.16(c)(1); Macias v. Hartwell, 55 Cal. App. 4th 669, 675 (1997). However, the
prevailing party “fee provision applies only to the motion to strike, and not to the entire action.”
S. B. Beach Prop. v. Berti, 39 Cal.4th 374, 138 (2006) (citations omitted). Nor does voluntary

Plaintiff’s reliance on Rossi is misplaced because, while the court does consider intentional
interference with contract in the context of a DMCA notice, it never addresses the issue of
whether DMCA preempts a state law claim. See Rossi v. Motion Picture Ass’n of Am., Inc.,
391 F.3d 1000, 1006-07 (9th Cir 2004).
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dismissal of the claim absolve the Plaintiff of liability for fees and costs incurred by Defendant
striking the claim. See eCash, 127 F. Supp. 2d at 1084.
III.

RULING

For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS X17, Inc.'s Motion To Strike, STRIKES
Plaintiff's third cause of action for intentional interference with contractual relations, and
DENIES AS MOOT Defendant's Motion to Dismiss Third Cause of Action in Plaintiff's First
Amended Complaint. Defendant is entitled to attorney's fees under Cal. Code Civ. Proc. §
425.16(c)(1). Defendant shall file within FOURTEEN (14) DAYS of the issuance of this order
an accounting of fees expended in opposition to Plaintiff’s third cause of action.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
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